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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to
countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to com-
pete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that, a subgroup of coun-
tries agreeing on a common tax rate, can harm both member and nonmember
states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonization
is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we
demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member coun-
tries. Moreover, both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off. This
conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from
the imposition of a lower tax bound.
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1 Introduction
The issue of corporate tax harmonization has been debated in the European Union
(EU) since the European Economic Community was established. Specifically, in 2003
the EU Council adopted a voluntary Code of Conduct against harmful tax competi-
tion, and more ambitious proposals for corporate tax harmonization have been pro-
posed, including the introduction of a single EU corporate tax (see Conconi et al.,
2008). The primary motivation for this is that the growing economic integration has
increased international mobility of capital and labor, which increasingly places down-
ward pressure on national tax policies. Consequently, many authors have noted that
independent governments engage in wasteful competition over scarce capital through
inefficiently low tax rates and public expenditure levels (Zodrow and Mieszkowski,
1986; Wilson, 1986). Accordingly, tax coordination is proposed to correct the alleged
inefficiencies caused by tax competition, as is highlighted in the tax literature (for sys-
tematic reviews, see Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Boadway and Tremblay,
2011).
However, neither a common corporate tax rate nor a minimum tax rate1 has been
successfully implemented in the EU2. Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) argue that some
countries may prefer a low tax status3. This is exemplified by tax havens, which have
a commercial interest in not harmonizing their taxation levels. Moreover, for political
reasons, it is also not always possible to agree on full tax coordination (Marchand et
al., 2003). Thus, as an alternative, partial tax coordination seems to be a more realistic
policy option. Partial coordination generally describes a situation in which each indi-
vidual agent cooperates with a subset of others but not with everyone in the economy
1The Ruding Committee (1992) proposed a common minimum corporate tax rate for the EU .
2Keen and Konrad (2012) argue that regional blocs other than the EU (Central America, East and
South Africa and elsewhere) have also sought to reach agreements limiting corporate tax competition
among themselves, but as in EU, with limited success.
3Burbidge et al. (1997) theoretically demonstrated that with more than two states, incomplete feder-
ation can be the unique equilibrium by assuming endogenous coalition formation.
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or the society (Beaudry et al., 2000). The Enhanced Cooperation Agreements (ECAs)4
among EU member states can be regarded as an example of partial coordination5.
The issue of partial coordination has been addressed in the tax competition litera-
ture. Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) demonstrated that in the standard tax competi-
tion framework, tax harmonization among a subset of countries is Pareto improving
if tax rates in the initial fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium are strategic comple-
ments. In addition, Conconi et al. (2008)6 suggest that, if capital is sufficiently mobile,
partial tax harmonization benefits all countries involved relative to both global and no
harmonization.
Many authors argue that jurisdictions compete not only in taxes but also in the pro-
vision of infrastructure (see Justman et al., 2002; Hindriks et al., 2008; Zissimos and
Wooders, 2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011). However, the existing literature on the desir-
ability of partial tax coordination is primarily based on the assumption that countries
solely compete in tax rates. In the present study, we investigate whether partial tax
coordination can benefit the countries within and outside the tax union when coun-
tries use taxes and infrastructure strategically7. One closely related contribution to our
work is Sørensen8 (2004), who shows that, when countries are symmetric, the outsider
enjoys a larger welfare gain from a binding minimum tax than countries in the union.
4EU member states are divided about whether or not to pursue corporate tax harmonization. For
this reason, a subset of European countries has recently been institutionalized in the form of Enhanced
Cooperation Agreements (ECAs) under the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2003). An ECAs
occurs if not all 27 Member States agree upon cooperation, but only a subgroup (or coalition) among
them (with a minimum of eight).
5Policy coordination among EU member states, rather than coordination with all of the countries in
Europe, can be regarded as another example of partial coordination.
6The paper analyzes partial tax coordination in a context with downward pressure on tax rates due
to tax competition on the one hand and upward pressure on tax rates due to time-consistent confiscatory
taxation on the other.
7In our paper, we do not focus on the stability of the tax union. We simply assume that the union is
formed by other factors outside the context of the tax competition problem.
8The model in the paper incorporates various forms of taxations, a public consumption good, in-
frastructure provision, and a redistributive lump sum transfer.
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Given cross-country asymmetries9, the welfare gains from regional tax coordination
mainly accrue to countries with high initial tax rates.
However, our setting differs from that in Sørensen (2004). First, he considers an
egalitarian social welfare function10. In our paper, we do not consider the redistrib-
utional aspects of tax policies, and thus we assume that the governments maximize
social welfare without concern for inequality. Therefore, we can exclusively focus on
the impact of policy coordination on social welfare. In addition, all of the strategic
variables are related via a budget constraint in Sørensen (2004), hence the equilibrium
taxes and public expenditures crucially depend, as Wildasin (1991) noted, on which
instrument is strategically selected11. However, recent empirical research (Hauptmeier
et al., 2012) demonstrates that jurisdictions use strategic tax rates and public inputs in-
dependently to compete for capital. Our model does not have this budget constraint12,
and hence taxes and expenditures are two independent strategic variables13.
In the present paper, we investigate the welfare implications of partial tax coordi-
nation when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure14. To this end, we assume
that only a subgroup of all countries considered forms a union. Moreover, the union’s
member states only coordinate their tax policies while still compete in the infrastruc-
ture provision. This implies that the union countries, while coordinating their tax rates,
are able to adjust their infrastructure policies to attract foreign capital. In addition, the
9Sørensen (2004) assumes that countries differ in pure profit shares, foreign ownership shares, initial
endowments, and social preferences regarding redistribution.
10The government in each country is concerned with the average individual welfare level and the
dispersion of individual utilities around this mean.
11Koethenbuerger (2011) also argues that models of local public finance predominantly assume that
local governments set taxes while expenditures are residually determined via the budget constraint.
12This is in the same vein as Hindriks et al. (2008), Zissimos and Wooders (2008), Pieretti and Zanaj
(2011), and Hauptmeier et al. (2012).
13The only condition we require is that the budget is non-negative, which is the case because the
jurisdictions are assumed to impose a lump sum tax to finance public expenditures if necessary, as
assumed in Hindriks et al. (2008).
14These infrastructure investments may represent material or immaterial public goods such as laws
and regulations protecting intellectual property and specifying accurate dispute resolution rules.
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union competes in taxes and infrastructure with the rest of the world.
Two partial coordination devices are considered successively. We first discuss the
welfare implications of tax harmonization (a common tax rate) within the union. Be-
cause a common tax rate may prove difficult to implement, we consider the case in
which a minimum tax rate is imposed within the union. We then analyze the related
welfare effects.
Our results show that a subgroup of countries agreeing to a common tax rate can
have adverse consequences for both union and nonunion countries. This is in stark
contrast with Konrad and Schjelderup’s (1999) finding that partial tax harmonization
is Pareto improving when jurisdictions solely compete in taxes. Our result also differs
from that in Sørensen (2004), in which partial coordination leaves all countries better
off, assuming countries compete in both15 taxes and infrastructure. In addition, we
demonstrate that both high tax and low tax countries can be worse off when a lower
tax bound is applied within the tax union. This result is at odds with Sørensen (2001,
2004), who concludes that the imposition of a minimum tax rate benefits the high tax
country and harms the low tax country.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we study the welfare impli-
cations of partial coordination when countries only compete in taxes. In section 3, we
derive optimal strategies from tax and infrastructure competition for each government.
Section 4 then compares social welfare with and without partial tax harmonization.
The welfare implications of a minimum tax rate are considered in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 The benchmark
As a benchmark, we first study the welfare implications of partial tax coordination
assuming countries compete only by taxes. As in Sørensen (2004), two cases are con-
15As we argued above, in his paper, taxes and infrastructure are not independent variables.
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sidered. We assume that a tax union implements a common tax rate with symmetric
competing countries. When the countries are asymmetric, we assume that a minimum
tax rate is imposed16 in the union.
2.1 Partial coordination with symmetric countries
Consider three identical countries i = 1; 2; 3. They compete in taxes to attract perfectly
mobile capital from the rest of the world. There is no domestic ownership of capital17.
We assume that the jurisdictions tax capital to extract rents from the capital owners.
The total stock of capital is fixed and normalized to 1. In each country, there is a rep-
resentative firm and the number of residents is normalized to one. The government in
country i selects a unit tax rate ti , which is source-based. Capital locates in the country
where profits are highest.
The production of the representative firm in each country is given by the function
Fi(ki), which is increasing, twice continuously differentiable and concave in the level
of capital ki ( i = 1; 2; 3). Under perfect mobility, the allocation of capital will equate its
net return  across all jurisdictions. This net return is assumed to be positive. We thus
obtain the following equality
 = f1(k1)  t1 = f2(k2)  t2 = f3(k3)  t3; (1)
where fi is the marginal product of capital in country i. The above arbitrage condition
determines the amount of capital in each country ki (i = 1; 2; 3). By setting an appro-
priate tax rate ti, each government maximizes the welfare Wi of its residents, the sum
of the return to the immobile factor and the tax revenue,
Wi = Fi(ki)  fi(ki)ki + tiki; (2)
16To the best of our knowledge, the welfare implications of imposing of a minimum tax rate among a
subset of countries has not been studied when they solely compete in taxes.
17This assumption is made in several contributions (see, for example, Hindriks et al., 2008; Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi, 2010).
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which is rebated to the residents. For reasons of tractability, we assume that the pro-
duction function takes the form18
Fi(ki) = aki   b
2
k2i ; (3)
where a > 0 is a shift parameter of the production function and b > 0 is the rate of
decline of the marginal product of capital relative to ki.
The parameter b plays a critical role in our model. The higher the value of b, the
lower the productivity of capital for a given amount of invested capital. As Machlup
(1991) pointed out, the scarcity degree of complementary factors influences the declin-
ing rate in marginal productivity. In other words, the scarcer these factors are the
higher the value of b should be.
Because the net return of capital must be nonnegative, we impose the condition19
a
b
> ki. The welfare function of country i becomes
Wi =
b
2
k2i + tiki: (4)
From (1), the capital invested in each jurisdiction is
k1 = k

2 = k

3 =
1
3
: (5)
Maximizing the welfare of each country yields the following optimal tax rates
t1 = t

2 = t

3 =
b
6
: (6)
The corresponding payoffs are
W 1 = W

2 = W

3 =
b
9
: (7)
In what follows, we assume that countries 1 and 2 form a tax union and set a com-
mon tax rate tc that maximizes the total welfare of the union. Country 3 remains out-
side and observes the coordination inside the union. Therefore, the tax union and
18Note that a linear quadratic production function is assumed by several authors, such as Bucovetsky
(1991, 2009), Peralta and Ypersele (2006), and Itaya (2008).
19In what follows, we assume that a is sufficiently large.
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country 3 compete for mobile capital by selecting taxes t and t3 noncooperatively. The
amount of capital located in each economy is then k1 = k2 = 14 and k3 =
1
2
. Solving the
game, the equilibrium tax rates are
tc =
b
2
; tc3 =
b
4
: (8)
The union as a whole faces a lower elasticity of capital supply than the individual
member states. Thus, the uniform tax rate is higher than the noncooperative equilib-
rium rates, tc > ti (i = 1; 2). Because tax rates are strategic complements, country 3 sets
a higher tax rate than in the noncooperative case, tc3 > t3. The resulting payoffs are
W c1 = W
c
2 =
5b
32
; W c3 =
b
4
: (9)
Comparing welfare levels with and without coordination, it is easy to see that
W ci  W i =
13
288
b > 0; i = 1; 2; (10)
W c3  W 3 =
5
36
b > 0:
That is, partial tax harmonization improves the welfare of all of the countries if we
only consider pure tax competition. This result is consistent with classical results (see
Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999).
2.2 Partial coordination with asymmetric countries
Countries can be asymmetric in many respects (see Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991;
Keen and Kanbur, 1993), such as size, initial resource endowments, and productivity.
In our paper, we assume that countries are heterogeneous in their degree of develop-
ment, which is reflected by a country specific productivity parameter. For simplicity20,
we assume21 that countries 2 and 3 are identical but characterized by a higher level
20More generally, we could consider that all the countries differ in terms of their level of development.
However, this would unnecessarily complicate the calculations without providing further insight.
21For a similar assumption, see Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), Burbidge and Cuff (2005), and Peralta
and van Ypersele (2005).
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of development than country 1. This is assumed without loss of generality. We thus
assume that F1(k1) < F2(k2) = F3(k3). The different production functions take the
following form
F1(k1) = ak1   b
2
k21; (11)
Fi(ki) = (a+ ") ki   b
2
k2i ; i = 2; 3;
where the shift parameter " is positively signed. We first solve the noncooperative
game among the three jurisdictions. We then analyze the welfare effects of the lower
bound on taxes.
When all countries compete, solving22 for the first order conditions (FOCs) leads to
the following equilibrium taxes
tn1 =
b
6
  2"
9
; tn2 = t
n
3 =
b
6
+
"
9
:
It follows that kn1 =
1
3
  4"
9b
and kn2 = kn3 =
1
3
+ 2"
9b
. The less developed country attracts
less capital relative to the advanced one, kn1 < kn2 = kn3 . The tax rate in country 1 is also
lower due to its low productivity, tn1 < tn2 = tn3 . The social welfare levels of the three
countries are
W n1 =
(3b  4")2
81b
; W n2 = W
n
3 =
(3b+ 2")2
81b
: (12)
Now we assume that countries 1 and 2 agree on a minimum tax rate tl that lies
between the noncooperative equilibrium tax rates. Because country 1 is the low tax
jurisdiction ( tn1 < tn2 ), it chooses the lower bound tl as its best strategy23. Countries
2 and 3 anticipate the tax policy of country 1 and respond strategically. The resulting
equilibrium tax rates are
tl1 = t
l; tl2 = t
l
3 =
1
7
(tl + b+ "):
22It is easy to check that Wi (i = 1; 2; 3) is concave in ti.
23This is because the social welfare function is concave in tax rates.
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The capital invested in the different countries is kl1 =
3b 4tl 4"
7b
and kl2 = kl3 =
2(b+tl+")
7b
.
As kli  0, we impose b  4"+4t
l
3
. The corresponding welfare levels for each country are
W l1 =
1
98b
(3b  4tl   4")(10tl + 3b  4")
W l2 = W
l
3 =
4
49b
(tl + b+ ")2:
Comparing cooperation with tax competition from the perspective of social welfare
(comparing W li with W ni ), we demonstrate that every country will be better off under
cooperation if tn1 < tl < minf 17180(3b  4"); tn2g.
That is, the minimum tax rate must be higher than the lowest rate in the non-
cooperative case, but sufficiently low for all of the countries to benefit from cooper-
ation.
3 Competition in taxes and infrastructure
In this section, we assume that the governments provide local firms with public goods
intended to enhance the productivity of private capital. Countries thus compete both
in taxes and the provision of infrastructure. The level of infrastructure provided by
country i (i = 1; 2; 3) is denoted gi. The results of the noncooperative competition will
serve as a baseline to gauge the desirability of tax harmonization. In the spirit of Hin-
driks et al. (2008), the production function, which is specific to country i (i = 1; 2; 3)
exhibits constant returns in infrastructure and takes the form
Fi(ki; gi) = (a+ gi) ki   b
2
k2i : (13)
The cost function of the public input is given by ci(gi) =
g2i
2
; i = 1; 2; 3. The convexity
reflects that the provision of public infrastructure is increasingly difficult. The equilib-
rium share of capital located in each country is determined by the arbitrage condition
 = f1(k1; g1)  t1 = f2(k2; g2)  t2 = f3(k3; g3)  t3; (14)
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where fi(ki; gi) = (a + gi)   bki is the marginal product of capital in country i and  is
the world interest rate. It follows that the amount of capital invested in country i is
ki =
1
3
  (gh + gj   2gi)  (th + tj   2ti)
3b
; h; j 6= i: (15)
The subscripts h and j (h; j = 1; 2; 3) refer to the other two countries.
Each government selects the tax rate and level of infrastructure that maximize its
welfare function
Wi = Fi(ki; gi)  fi(ki; gi)ki + tiki   g
2
i
2
(16)
=
b
2
k2i + tiki  
g2i
2
:
In the following, we solve a two-stage game. In the first stage, countries select the
public expenditure levels. Tax rates are set in the second stage for given infrastructure
levels that are selected in the first stage24. We solve the game by backward induction.
3.1 Tax game
First, we focus on the tax game. It is easy to verify that the welfare function Wi is
concave in ti. The best tax response of country i is
ti =
1
8
[(gh + gj   2gi) + (th + tj) + b] ; h; j 6= i: (17)
Because the reply functions are upward sloping, taxes are strategic complements. Note
also that the slope is less than one, which ensures the stability of the equilibrium. By
solving the system of equations (17), we derive the Nash equilibrium in taxes
ti =
1
18
[4gi   2(gh + gj) + 3b] : (18)
24The choice of sequentiality follows the rule that the most irreversible decision must be made first.
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3.2 Infrastructure game
At the first stage, each jurisdiction maximizes its payoff with respect to its infrastruc-
ture provision gi. The FOCs yield
gi =
8(2gh + 2gf   3b)
81b  32 ; h; j 6= i: (19)
We require that b > 32
81
to ensure that the objective functions in gi are concave. The
equilibrium public expenditure of country i is
gi =
8
27
: (20)
Introducing (20) into the equations (18) yields the equilibrium tax rate of country i
ti =
b
6
: (21)
The amount of capital invested in country i is ki =
1
3
. The welfare of country i is then
W i =
1
729
(81b  32) ; i = 1; 2; 3; (22)
which is positive because b > 32
81
.
4 Partial tax harmonization
In this section, we analyze whether partial tax harmonization is desirable. To that end,
we assume that countries 1 and 2 form a tax union and set a common tax rate t that
maximizes their joint welfare. However, the member states of the union are assumed to
select their infrastructure levels noncooperatively. This is because many infrastructure
expenditures primarily satisfy internal policy goals and are incidentally attractive to
foreign investments. Therefore, it is difficult to coordinate these types of sovereign
decisions. Country 3 stays outside the union and observes the coalition of countries 1
and 2. The outsider competes with the union as a whole by providing infrastructure in
the first stage and competes over tax rates in the second stage. We first solve the game,
and then compare social welfare with and without tax policy coordination.
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4.1 Competition with partial tax harmonization
Beginning from the second stage, the FOCs in tax rates25 yield
t =
1
6
(g1 + g2   2g3 + 3b); (23)
t3 =
1
12
( g1   g2 + 2g3 + 3b):
We observe that the larger the rate of decline of marginal productivity b, the higher the
tax rate will be for a given level of public infrastructure provision. The reason is that
the marginal productivity of capital is lower for a higher value of b, which results in a
lower demand for capital. The competition for capital is relaxed, and tax rates increase.
In the first stage, the three countries compete in public infrastructure. Solving the
FOCs with respect to gi, we obtain the equilibrium levels of infrastructure provision
gu1 = g
u
2 =
23 (9b  4)
18 (24b  13) ; (24)
gu3 =
2 (36b  23)
9 (24b  13) :
To guarantee the concavity of Wi in gi, we impose b > 77144 . This condition is fulfilled
if we require that the level of infrastructure gi is nonnegative, which requires that b >
23
36
. Substituting (24) into (23), we obtain the equilibrium tax rates
tu =
4b (9b  4)
3 (24b  13) ; (25)
tu3 =
b (36b  23)
6 (24b  13) :
It is easy to verify that the uniform tax rate within the union is higher than that
of the outsider, tu > tu3 , as the union as a whole faces a lower tax elasticity of capital.
However, to remain attractive, the tax union must provide more public infrastructure
than the outsider. Indeed, we obtain gu1 = gu2 > gu3 . The amount of capital located in
25It is easy to verify that W1 +W2 is concave in t and W3 is concave in t3:
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each country is
ku1 = k
u
2 =
2 (9b  4)
3 (24b  13) ; (26)
ku3 =
36b  23
3 (24b  13) :
The resulting welfare levels are given as follows
W u1 = W
u
2 =
(9b  4)2(720b  529)
648(24b  13)2 ; (27)
W u3 =
(36b  23)2(9b  2)
81(24b  13)2 ;
which are positive when b > b = 529
720
. In the following, we assume that condition b > b
always holds.
4.2 Comparing social welfare
Because the member states of the union are identical, we can write
W u1  W 1 = W u2  W 2 (28)
=
32
729
  b
9
+
(9b  4)2(720b  529)
648(24b  13)2 :
It is easy to check thatW ui  W i > 0 (i = 1; 2), if b > bwhere b = 1:09. Consequently,
partial tax harmonization improves the welfare of countries 1 and 2 if the value of b is
sufficiently high. However, setting a uniform tax rate makes the union members worse
off if b < b < b.
To understand the intuition underlying this result, first note that a "low" value of b
(b < b) implies that the demand for capital and hence competition for capital is "high".
However, when the value of b is relatively "high" (b > b), competition for capital is
"low". Furthermore, when the union is constrained by a uniform tax rate, infrastruc-
ture competition becomes more pronounced than in the noncooperative case (gui > gi ).
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Thus the intuition is straightforward. When international competition for capital is in-
tense (b < b), partial tax harmonization results in the over-use of costly infrastructure
spending. The additional net output26 induced by an increased amount of infrastruc-
ture spending in the case of partial tax harmonization is overcompensated by the ad-
ditional cost of providing infrastructure. Thus, agreeing on a common tax rate reduces
the welfare of the union countries relative to the noncooperative scenario (W i > W ui ).
However, when competition for capital is less intense ( b > b), partial tax harmoniza-
tion improves the social welfare of the tax union (W ui  W i > 0, i = 1; 2), as the net
output increase it induces exceeds the additional cost of providing infrastructure.
The following result can be stated
Proposition 1 If a subgroup of countries commits to a common tax rate but competes in in-
frastructure, social welfare in the tax union falls when b < b < b and rises when b > b relative
to noncooperative competition in taxes and infrastructure.
Now consider the impact of partial tax harmonization on the outsider’s welfare.
The welfare change in the nonmember state resulting from partial harmonization is
W u3  W 3 =
32
729
  b
9
+
(36b  23)2(9b  2)
81(24b  13)2 : (29)
Solving W u3  W 3 = 0 yields the unique27 root b < bm = 0:76. Consequently, tax
harmonization in the union increases the welfare of the nonmember state when b > bm
but decreases its welfare when b < b < bm.
The underlying intuition can be explained as follows. When the value of b is suf-
ficiently low, b < bm, the member states compete aggressively in infrastructure as we
26Indeed, it is convenient to write Wui  W i = Ii   Ci (i = 1; 2), which means that the welfare
change induced by the transition from noncooperative tax competition to partial harmonization results
from a net output gain (Ii = (Fi(kui ; g
u
i )   ukui )   (Fi(ki ; gi )   ki ) and a change in the cost of
providing public inputs (Ci =
(gui )
2
2   (g

i )
2
2 ), where 
u and  are interest rates with and without
partial tax harmonization, respectively.
27We account for the condition that b > b.
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highlighted above. This results in an over-provision of infrastructure by the union.
Moreover, the infrastructure expenditures of the competing entities (union versus the
outsider) are strategic substitutes28. Consequently, the outsider country will under-
provide infrastructure and compete with low taxes. Eventually, the union attracts more
capital than in the noncooperative case, and hence less capital flows to the nonunion
country. As a result, the outsider’s gain from lower investment costs29 does not com-
pensate for the loss it incurs in net output. Accordingly, its social welfare decreases
when countries 1 and 2 coordinate tax policy. When the value of b is sufficiently high,
b > bm, the member states provide a relatively moderate level of infrastructure. Be-
cause infrastructure expenditures are strategic substitutes, the outsider will not sub-
stantially reduce its provision of public inputs, and tax competition will not be exces-
sively intense. As a result, the outsider will attract sufficient capital30, and hence its
social welfare will be higher than in the noncooperative case.
The following proposition concludes
Proposition 2 If a subgroup of countries commits to a common tax rate while competing in
infrastructure, the social welfare of the nonmember state declines if b < b < bm and increases
when b > bm relative to noncooperative competition in taxes and infrastructure.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we can conclude the following. When b < b < bm, both
the tax union and the outsider are worse off. When bm < b < b, the tax union is worse
off while the nonmember state is better off. If b > b, all of the countries benefit from
the partial tax harmonization.
These results are at odds with the findings in pure tax competition (Konrad and
28The FOCs of the infrastructure game in the tax harmonization case yield the best response functions
gu1 = g
u
2 =
 46g3+69b
144b 46 for countries 1 and 2 and g
u
3 =
 2gu1+3b
9b 2 for country 3.
29Similarly, we consider the decomposition Wu3   W 3 = I3   C3, where I3 and C3 are the
variations in the net output and the cost of infrastructure provision, respectively.
30Note that the world interest rate under partial tax coordination is lower than in the noncooperative
game.
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Schjelderup, 1999)31, where partial tax harmonization is Pareto improving if the tax
rates in the initial fully noncooperative equilibrium are strategic complements. They
are also in contrast to the result obtained by Sørensen (2004) that all countries are better
off with partial tax harmonization, although the union countries gain less than the
outside country.
5 A minimum tax rate
In the previous section, we demonstrated that partial tax harmonization does not nec-
essarily improve welfare in the tax union when countries compete in both taxes and
infrastructure. Does the imposition of a minimum tax rate improve the member states’
welfare? To answer this question, we assume that in a first stage, each country nonco-
operatively selects its level of public investment. In a second stage, each country sets
its tax rate subject to a lower bound, which is imposed on the union countries. Country
3 is not subject to this tax constraint.
5.1 Competition with a minimum tax rate
As in the benchmark model (pure tax competition with asymmetric countries), we as-
sume that F1(k1; g1) < F2(k2; g2) = F3(k3; g3) without loss of generality. The production
function takes the form32
F1(k1; g1) = (a+ g1) k1   b
2
k21; (30)
Fi(ki; gi) = (a+ gi + ") ki   b
2
k2i ; i = 2; 3;
where " is positive.
31Our result also contradicts the finding in Conconi et al. (2008) that partial tax harmonization benefits
all of the countries relative to the noncooperative case.
32The production function is similar to that in Hindriks et al. (2008).
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By analogy to section 3, we are able to demonstrate that country 1 is the low tax
country if all countries choose the levels of their tax rates and infrastructure noncoop-
eratively. Indeed, in equilibrium we obtain
tnon1 = b(
1
6
  6"
27b  16);
tnon2 = t
non
3 = b(
1
6
+
3"
27b  16);
and33
gnon1 =
8
27
  32"
81b  48 ;
gnon2 = g
non
3 =
8
27
+
16"
81b  48 :
Therefore, if a minimum tax rate  is agreed between countries 1 and 2, it only34
binds country 1 and induces it to choose this lower bound. Solving the game back-
wardly, where countries 1 and 2 cooperatively set a lower bound on taxes  , we obtain
the equilibrium tax rates
tmin1 =  ;
tmin2 = t
min
3 =
3( + b)(7b  4) + 21b"
147b  88 ;
and the levels of infrastructure
gmin1 =
4( + b)(63b  40)  336b"
7b(147b  88) ; (31)
gmin2 = g
min
3 =
40 [( + b)(7b  4) + 7b"]
7b(147b  88) :
Concavity is guaranteed if b > 200
441
.
33The superscript ”non00 denotes value in the noncooperative equilibrium.
34We only consider the case in which the minimum tax rate lies between the noncooperative equilib-
rium rates, as in Keen and Kanbur (1993).
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5.2 Comparing social welfare
Let Wmini and W noni denote the welfare of country i with and without minimum tax
coordination, respectively. The welfare difference is given by
Wi = W
min
i  W noni (32)
= Ai(b)
2 +Bi(b; ") + Ci(b; ");
where Ai(b) is a function35 of parameter b. Bi(b; ") and Ci(b; ") are functions of the pa-
rameters b and ". The roots of equation Wmini   W noni = 0 can be positive, negative,
or complex depending on the values of the parameters. Therefore, the imposition of a
minimum tax can be welfare improving or welfare worsening for the countries inside
and outside the union. To illustrate the impact of a lower tax bound on welfare, we
provide simulations with different values for the parameter36 pair (b; "). The horizon-
tal axis represents  , and the vertical axis denotes the change in welfare Wi, where
W2 = W3.
First, we set b = 1 and consider different values of ". When " = 0:1, we show in
Figure 1(a) that the low tax country always loses, while the high tax country (Figure 1
(b)) always gains. However, in Figure 2 when " = 0:3, the low tax country can gain if
the lower tax bound is not excessively high, and countries 2 and 3 lose if the bound 
is excessively low.
35A1(b) < 0, and A2(b) = A3(b) > 0:
36For each figure,  begins at its minimum value, i.e., the noncooperative equilibrium tax rate of
country 1, as we assume that the lower bound lies between the two noncooperative equilibra.
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Figure 1(a) social welfare change for
country 1, " = 0:1
0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
(b) social welfare changes for
countries 2 and 3, " = 0:1
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.0010
0.0005
Figure 2(a) social welfare change for
country 1, " = 0:3
0 .010 0 .015 0 .020 0 .025 0 .030
0 .001
0 .001
0 .002
(b) social welfare changes for
countries 2 and 3, " = 0:3
We then set " = 0:2 and consider different values of b. Figure 3 demonstrates that
when b = 0:8, the low tax country loses if the minimum tax rate is excessively high,
while countries 2 and 3 always gain. However, Figure 4 (a) illustrates that country 1 is
always worse off if b = 1:0, while the high tax countries (Figure 4 (b)) can be harmed if
the lower tax bound is not sufficiently high.
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Figure 3(a) social welfare change for
country 1, b = 0:8
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(b) social welfare changes for
countries 2 and 3, b = 0:8
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Figure 4(a) social welfare change for
country 1, b = 1:0
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(b) social welfare changes for
countries 2 and 3, b = 1:0
The results highlighted by the above simulations are in contrast to those resulting
from pure tax competition when a minimum tax rate is imposed. When countries only
compete in taxes, we have shown that all of the countries can be better off as long as
the minimum tax is not excessively high. However, our simulations reveal cases where
the imposition of a lower tax bound does not necessarily improve the social welfare of
the member sates37 when the minimum tax rate is sufficiently low. It can even harm
the high tax countries38, which differs from the findings of Sørensen (2001, 2004), who
37This result still holds when country 1 is the more advanced country. We can demonstrate this in a
similar way and the proof is available upon request.
38Note that the high tax countries could be member or nonmember states.
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shows that establishing a minimum tax rate only harms the low tax country. When
the tax bound is sufficiently high, the welfare effects depend crucially on the values of
parameters b and ".
We state the results in the following proposition
Proposition 3 When countries compete in taxes and infrastructure, the imposition of a suffi-
ciently low tax bound within a subgroup of countries does not necessarily improve the social
welfare of the tax union. It can even harm both the high and low tax countries.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the welfare implications of partial tax coordination when
countries compete strategically in taxes and infrastructure. In a three-country model,
we assume that two countries form a union and only coordinate their tax policy, while
they compete in the provision of infrastructure. Moreover, the tax union competes
with the nonunion country both in taxes and infrastructure. After assuming that all of
the countries are identical, we first analyze the welfare effects of the establishment of a
uniform tax rate within the union. We then explore the welfare effects of a lower bound
on taxes when the member states are asymmetric in their levels of development.
We demonstrate first that partial tax coordination can harm both the member and
nonmember states. Essentially, partial tax coordination allows the member states to
freely compete in infrastructure for foreign direct investment while, to some extent,
preventing them from defending their competitive situation in a globalized economy.
Second, we demonstrate that the high tax country can also be made worse off under
partial coordination, which contrasts with the general belief that only the low tax coun-
try loses. This could be a caveat for high tax countries such as France and Germany,
which are pushing the European Union to speed up tax coordination efforts39. Finally,
39As first stated in the Financial Times (May 2, 2003, p2), which was then followed by a report in the
Irish Examiner (an Irish national daily newspaper) on January 18, 2012, indicating that Germany and
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our results suggest that low productivity countries should opt for tax harmonization.
Indeed, our results show that tax harmonization among these countries leaves them
better off.
When the taxation polices of states are subject to policy coordination, their expendi-
ture decisions are unfettered. To be in a favorable position regarding the constraints of
tax coordination, the competing jurisdictions may choose to be a leader or a follower
in infrastructure competition. Future research should address the desirability of tax
coordination by endogenizing the timing of infrastructure decisions.
France are pushing the EU to speed up tax coordination efforts, despite Irish and British opposition, and
will soon make proposals to harmonize corporate tax rates. The call is contained in a document to be
discussed at the EU summits on January 30 and in March of 2012.
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